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21ST CENTURY 
DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE 
DATA DOSSIER
information mutate into weapons of mass 
distraction and disorientation. Legitimate 
online discourse is subverted by cyber 
threats and manipulation. In short, liberal 
democracy is in danger of losing its pow-
er to generate the consensus and compro-
mises so vitally needed for the cohesion of 
our pluralistic societies.
At the same time, however, there is 
hope for democracy. Citizens actively 
make their voices heard. People want to 
have their say in politics, participate and 
interact with the political system also 
between general elections. Social move-
ments are on the rise and strengthen civil 
society. Requests for deliberative democ-
racy increase, and participatory practice 
supports de-politicisation and consen-
sus-building, as two Irish referenda on 
highly contested topics have exemplified. 
Debunking becomes a central corrective 
instrument within the public debate, and 
post-factual argumentation is increasing-
ly uncovered and denounced as such. Cit-
izens feel more attached to the EU than 
ever before. European and global youth 
have mobilised to protect and shape their 
own future, and to demand their say in 
safeguarding the global commons.
This EUI SOU 2019 Data Dossier il-
lustrates key trends in democratic tran-
sitions, political parties and elections, 
inclusive and sustainable democracies, 
trust and the Single Market, as well as EU 
external action and global governance 
through facts and figures. It has been cre-
ated by the GlobalStat team to inform the 
discussion about the state of democracy 
within the EU. It seeks to inspire reflec-
tion on past democratic trends and on 
trajectories for possible futures for de-




Things taken for granted become pre-cious when we are about to lose them. 
This is the case of democracy in Europe 
and around the world today. Hence, we 
need to critically reflect on the future of 
the type of democracy we want in the 21st 
century. The European University Insti-
tute’s The State of the Union Conference 
2019 (SOU) provides a much-needed op-
portunity to do so at European level.
After the end of World War II and the 
fall of the Iron Curtain, liberal democra-
cy became the foundation of European 
societies and the European Union (EU). 
By the dawn of the 21st century, most EU 
Member States (MS) had a long-standing 
democratic tradition. Where this was not 
the case, citizens fought hard for liberal 
societies and democratic transition.
Liberal democracies protect individu-
al freedoms, participatory rights, and the 
rule of law within societies. They guar-
antee representation, procedural equity, 
lawful decision-making, legitimate polit-
ical action, accountable actors, impartial 
bureaucracies, and independent judiciar-
ies and media. 
Thus far the ideal. Two decades into 
the 21st century, we witness a decline in 
key democratic features in an increasing 
number of countries within Europe and 
around the world. Rules-based organ-
isations and core institutions of liberal 
democracy are under siege. Populism is 
on the rise and identity politics divides 
societies into ‘us and them’; politicisa-
tion accompanies this division, rendering 
politics confrontational and hard-line; 
patterns of authoritarian leadership ap-
pear and ‘strong men’ are back in politics. 
Truth and facts become strategic tools; 
ideology, ‘post-factual evidence’, and mis-
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Austria, Denmark, Belgium,
France, (Western) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands all followed a
similar trajectory, picking up quickly,
then steadily after the Second World War
Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, 
and Romania democratise 
after the end of the Cold War
Greece democratises
 briefly, while Cyprus
 picks up steadily
Greece, Portugal and Spain
emerge from dictatorships
Finland, Ireland and Sweden
were virtually unphased
by the Second World War
Fledgling democracies after
 the First World War


















































Among representative democracies, liberal democracies stand out for 
their participatory patterns, the protec-
tion of individual freedoms – including 
those of most vulnerable groups – and 
the rule of law. This type of democracy 
prevails among EU MS and is especially 
strong in Scandinavian countries, while 
some MS in Central and Eastern Europe 
are currently facing challenges to their 
liberal democratic practice. 
As a result, and regardless of the overall 
good track record and their long-stand-
ing tradition, democratic politics within 
the EU are currently being challenged by 
bottom-up, grassroots protest movements 
and new political parties. Consequently, 
liberal democracy is increasingly contest-
ed, and various authoritarian patterns of 





TO WHAT EXTENT IS 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY ACHIEVED?
V-DEM SCORE, 1900-2017






among the 28 Member States of the EU. 






























































































































































































































Open democratic societies rely on legitimate and accountable political institutions and on democratic elections that allow 
citizens to express their preferences with regard to politics. In view 
of the 2019 European Elections – as with democratic elections and 
participatory processes in general – ensuring free and fair demo-
cratic voting and practice is hence imperative. This even more so 
against the backdrop of a growing electoral volatility over the past 
two decades, in which the stability of the West European party sys-
tems eroded due to new political parties and political protagonists 




As regards citizens’ preferences for EU 
politics, their attachment to the Union 
has increased over the past eight years 
from 62% in 2010 to 70% in 2018: more 
Europeans than ever before perceive 
themselves as EU citizens. Moreover, 52% 
of EU citizens have trust in the EU, show-
ing that they identify the EU as a beacon 
of freedom that guarantees the possibility 
of travelling, studying and working free-
ly within its territory. Yet, this positive 
perception has so far not translated into 
European Elections turnout: from the 
highest participation rate of 61.99% in 
the European elections of 1979, turn out 
constantly decreased, leading to the low-
est rate ever registered, with 42.61% in the 
last elections of 2014.
almost
80%
of those below 
30 years
in Austria, Italy and Malta
voted at any level of government 
in the past three years, as 






in EU Member States moved 
towards the right in 
their last elections, as 





























































































Gap between GHG 
projections and 
2020 target in 
Effort Sharing 
sectors





























































































































































Young Europeans are growing up in difficult times. The financial, eco-
nomic and migration crises, coupled with 
climate change, are deepening the inter-
generational gap in opportunities and re-
sponsibilities. Any sustainable democracy 
depends on the material and immaterial 
resources that are passed from the present 
to the next generation. To preserve plan-
etary resources and to combat climate 
change, the EU aims at a climate-neutral 
circular economy by 2050. Reduction of 
resource input, reusage of material and 






ELECTORAL LAWS PER 
EU MEMBER STATE
The future of the EU strongly depends 
on its youth and on migration. Both have 
important effects on the intergenerational 
equity and political participation with-
in the EU. One of the most direct ways 
of promoting political participation of 
migrant populations is granting them 
the right to vote. Yet, so far, no Europe-
an Member State grants national voting 
rights to all foreign residents. EU citizens 
can vote in local elections in other EU 
MS. Only 12 MS grant local voting rights 
to all foreign residents. 
FRAMEWORK FOR 
CLIMATE AND ENERGY
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
REDUCTIONS AND TARGET 
ACHIEVEMENT
Regardless of economic and labour mar-
ket recovery, the EU still faces strong dif-
ferences between MS in terms of youth 
unemployment and economically inactive 
young people. Mitigation options could 
include allocating shares of MS European 
Social Fund resources to especially target 






by almost 9 pp from a 
peak of 23.7% in 2013 






in Germany is the lowest in 
the EU in 2018, followed by 
the Czech Republic (6.7%) 
and the Netherlands (7.2%). 
It has risen to critical 
39.9% in Greece, 34.3% in 





below 1990 levels by 2020 and 
32% by 2030, thus falling 
short of the self-set goal 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The creation of the Single Market is one of the EU’s major achievements 
and best assets within economic globali-
sation. The concentration of econom-
ic and financial power is still a threat to 
global economic equity that favours mul-
tinationals in only some countries.  
The global financial and economic cri-
ses also revealed weaknesses in the eco-
nomic governance of the EU and in the 
Euro. They triggered a retrenchment of 
cross-border banking and financial activi-
ties, and led to an intensified debate about 
risk-sharing and risk-reduction initiatives 
within the Economic and Monetary Un-
ion (EMU). While related reforms have 
built-up a common regulatory and super-
visory framework, banking and financial 
activities are still regulated nationally, 
even within the Euro area. As stabilising 
factor for the EMU and the Euro, national 
tax revenue accounts for the main share 
of public resources.
TRUST AND THE 
SINGLE MARKET 
COUNTRIES’ TAX REVENUE 
AND SOME EUROPEAN 
MULTINATIONALS IN 
FORBES’ TOP 500
2017 TAXES ON PRODUCTION 
AND IMPORTS LESS SUBSIDIES 
AND 2018 PROFITS, € BN
Sources: Eurostat, (2019); 
Forbes, (2019)
NET PRIVATE AND 
PUBLIC WEALTH
INDIVIDUAL AVERAGE, PPP, 
1900-2016, CONSTANT 2017 €
This level of economic inequalities is 
confirmed when comparing net private 
wealth and net national income. Data 
show a general rise in net private wealth 
since 1970, from 200% to 350% of na-
tional income in most rich countries, to 
400% to 700% today. This trend was large-
ly unaffected by the 2008 financial crisis 
or by the asset price bubbles in countries 
like Japan and Spain. Transition countries 
such as China and Russia have also wit-
nessed large increases in private wealth
with private wealth-income ratios ap-
proaching levels observed in France, the 
UK, and the United States.




of EU-28 GDP equaled 
taxes applied to capital, 
labour and consumption, as 
well as compulsory social 




































































































2014 2017 2018 2020
2014-2020


















































Ever since the Lisbon treaty, EU exter-nal action has gained in importance. 
In light of the global challenges lying 
ahead, democratising the policy field fea-
tures high within the political debate. 
Current EU decision-making in ex-
ternal action displays multi-layered, in-
ter-institutional dynamics that reflect its 
connected, complex foreign policy issues. 
The EU seeks to improve the effectiveness 
of its external action and its consistency 
with EU values, as prerequisite for a sus-
tainable contribution to peace and securi-
ty around the world.
EU EXTERNAL 
ACTION AND GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE
WHO DOES WHAT IN THE 
EU INSTITUTIONS?
Source: European Parliamentary 
Research Service (2019), Peace and 
Security in 2018 - Overview of EU 
action and outlook for the future
COMMON SECURITY AND 
DEFENCE POLICY MISSIONS 
AND OPERATIONS
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL 
AS OF DECEMBER 2017
Source: EU Institute for 
Security Studies, (2018)
MFF HEADING 4 OVERVIEW
2014-2020, € MILLION
Funding for ‘Global Europe’ activities 
supports joint efforts of EU MS and EU 
institutions, each of which relates to the 
peace and security agenda and has a spe-
cific geographic or thematic focus in or-
der to maximise impact and visibility of 
EU external action.
Source: EU Institute for 
Security Studies, (2018)
6%
Within the 2014-2020 Multiannual 
Financial Framework, 6% of the EU budget 
support ‘Global Europe’ activities
GlobalStat is a public information tool for users around the world that o ers a large amount of statistical data free 
of charge from international sources for all 193 UN member states, from 1960 to present day. It focuses on the 
economic, environmental, political, social, and cultural performance of nations and its ultimate aim is to provide 
information about the way human beings live, the freedoms they enjoy and the limitations they face.
ABOUT             
Today’s increasing relevance of statistics translates only slowly into a 
transparent visibility of data within the public domain. In order to close the 
gap between data proliferation and their actual use, new tools are needed 
to improve the clarity and speed with which statistical data can be accessed 
as important independent sources of information. GlobalStat takes up this 
challenge. 
It is structured in 12 thematic and three horizontal areas.  ematic areas are 
divided into sub-themes that include statistical data series. Horizontal areas 
o er insight into data on cross-cutting aspects of sustainable livelihood, 
national wealth, human well-being and quality of life. GlobalStat currently 
contains over 600 indicators and is designed to grow over time. 
May 2019 | GLOBALSTAT - factsheet    Robert Schuman Centrewww.globalstat.eu
By presenting data as diverse as income distribution, water resources, 
migration, land use, food production, nutrition, or life expectancy,  GlobalStat 
contributes to a better understanding of the  potential interrelations between 
human development and globalisation trends. All data and metadata are 




Partnership between the 
European University Institute’s 
Global Governance Programme 
(GGP) and the Francisco 
Manuel dos Santos Foundation
Gaby Umbach is the Founding 
Director of GlobalStat
O  cial launch of the GlobalStat 
website
GlobalStat starts a 
collaboration with the European 
Parliamentary Research Service 
(EPRS) 
Launch of joint publication 
series with EPRS
GlobalStat is embedded in the 
EPRS website
GlobalStat starts a collaboration 
with the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)
GlobalStat becomes o  cial 
supporting partner of the EUI’s 
State of the Union Conference 










Since October 2015, a partnership between GlobalStat and the European 
Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) o ers an ever-increasing portfolio 
of data-based services and publications to GlobalStat users and Members 
of the European Parliament (EP). Since September 2016, GlobalStat is also 
integrated as the new ‘Statistics Warehouse’ resource into the EPRS’s intranet 
in order to provide direct access to GlobalStat for EPRS clients.
A cooperation with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) started in mid-2016 and is ongoing with the creation 
of new GlobalStat website with SDMX updates and data visualisation tools.
Project Director: Gaby Umbach 
Research Associates and Fellows: Caterina 
Francesca Guidi (Project Coordinator); 
former team members: Laura Bartolini, Luca 
Mancini, Laura Puccio, Martiño Rubal Maseda, 
Marta Russo, Trajche Panov 
Database development GlobalStat 1.0: Copyright 
© European University Institute and Fundação 
Francisco Manuel dos Santos
CONTACTS:
European University Institute
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 





Text developed by 
Caterina Francesca Guidi and Gaby Umbach
Data visualisation created by 
Christian Dietrich
With the financial support of the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
16 ■  RSCAS | Policy Brief | Issue 2019/10 | May 2019
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
Th e Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laff an, aims to 
develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, Euro-
pean societies and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. Th e Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and 
hosts major research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. 
Th e research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, refl ecting the changing agenda of 
European integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the 
wider world.
 e Global Governance Programme 
Th e Global Governance Programme (GGP) is research turned into action. It provides a European setting to conduct research 
at the highest level and promote synergies between the worlds of research and policy-making, to generate ideas and identify 
creative an innovative solutions to global challenges. Th e Programme is part of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies of the European University Institute, a world-reknowned academic institution.  It receives fi nancial support from the 
European Commission through the European Union budget. Complete information on our activities can be found online at:  
globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu
Content © Caterina Francesca Guidi, Gaby Umbach, Christian Dietrich.
Views expressed in this publication re ect the opinion of individual authors and 
not those of the European University Institute or the European Commission.
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